Formed on December 31, 2015, the PLA SSF centralised space, cyber, electronic and psychological warfare capabilities into a single service. It was formed to create synergies between various advanced warfighting capabilities and was hailed as instrumental in achieving Xi’s stated goals of modernisation, informatisation, and converting the PLA into a world-class army. With this change, the PLA now has a new system with four services – the Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force, and four arms – the Aerospace Force, Cyberspace Force, Information Support Force and Joint Logistic Support Force.
What is Information Support Force?
The Information Support Force (信息支援部队), as clarified by the PLA spokesperson Wu Qian, is a new PLA arm along with the Aerospace Force, the Cyberspace Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force. Earlier, the PLA space, cyber and network capabilities were clubbed together into the PLA SSF. Furthermore, the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) was an additional independent force that provided strategic logistics support to all five theatre commands. But now, the PLA SSF is broken down into three arms alongside the JLSF. Early reports indicate that the ISF will be responsible for the PLA communications networks and network defence.
The PLA’s Information Communications Base (ICB) earlier held this responsibility under the PLA SSF. The ICBs were mandated to provide information support and enable communication for the entire army. The formation of these bases highlights the importance of network support and network defence for moving towards “multi-domain integrated joint operations” and “joint operations under the conditions of intelligentisation” – CMC’s 2019 stated goals.
What was the previous structure?
The 2019 PRC national defence white paper described the PLASSF as ‘a new type of combat force for safeguarding national security and an important driver for the growth of new combat capabilities.’ With the integration of the Space Systems Department (航天系统部) and the Network Systems Department (网络系统部), the PLA SSF was mandated to consolidate the Chinese military’s space systems capabilities and oversee cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities to enable strategic deterrence and create strategic offensive in the newer domains of warfare. Furthermore, as Kania and Costello’s research highlights, the SSF was also mandated to provide certain supporting functions like battlefield environment protection, information and communications assurance, information security protection, as well as new technology testing. Put simply, in the past, the PLA SSF merged the second and third departments of the General Staff Department; now it is separated.How will this change impact these operations?
The preliminary reports indicate that the space operations would be delegated to the Aerospace force, the cyber and electronic, psychological warfare operations would be delegated to the cyberspace force, and the battlefield environment protection, information and communication assurance, and information security protection would be with the ISF. The JLSF would continue with its logistic support and strategic delivery responsibilities.
Why this change now?
There could be multiple permutations and combinations for this change. Corruption has always been a significant problem for the PLA and one of the stated reasons for Xi’s 2015 Chinese military reforms. Additionally, the PLA Rocket Force (PLA RF) and PLA SSF were mired in complex corruption charges in 2023, resulting in the disappearance of its leadership. But it will be a bit of a stretch to claim that only corruption led to this reorganisation.
As former US Deputy National Intelligence Officer Mark Parker Young highlights, the PLA has struggled for many years on certain critical functions like cyber operations, intelligence support, and overseeing the development of C4ISR architectures.
However, since the Gulf War of 1991, the PLA has been aware of the learnings and application of newer military technologies from other wars. With the use of advanced tech and the increased importance of quick reaction time in the ongoing Russian-Ukraine War and the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Chinese military leadership could have rethought the importance of decentralisation of forces for rapid, flexible responses.
Finally, there are also questions regarding the PLA SSF’s tangible deliverables in the past eight years. However, these are extremely difficult to measure but could be due to multiple factors like the lack of specialised recruitments, bureaucratic inertia, corruption or incompetence resulting to this shake-up.
Who are the new ISF commanders?
Lt Gen Bi Yi is appointed as the Commander of the ISF and Gen Li Wei is appointed as a Political Commissar. Bi was previously the Deputy Commander of the PLA SSF and has also served as the Deputy Minister of the Training Management Department of the Central Military Commission. Li was the Political Commissar of the South Xinjiang Military Region, Xinjiang Military Region and also the PLA SSF.
How will it impact the PLA’s combat readiness?
There are two ways of analysing the PLA’s combat readiness and implications for regional security. If corruption and incompetence were the drivers of this reorganisation, then it could be said that the PLA is still far away from actual combat readiness. These newly formed arms would have to take a life of their own to be combat-ready.
Furthermore, with the surfacing of multiple corruption allegations in 2023, the morale of the forces, especially the PLA Rocket Force, would be low.
On the other hand, the parallel establishment of these four arms is a significant step towards integrated joint operations. The fact that the commanders of these forces can now directly report to the CMC, instead of having to go through the SSF commander, is a positive development. This change not only streamlines the reporting process but also indicates progress towards achieving intelligentisation and integration.
Suyash Desai is a research scholar specialising in China’s military and foreign policy. He is currently studying advanced Chinese language at the National Taiwan Normal University.
